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REMOTE DEVICE AUTHENTICATION

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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates generally to the field of wireless communications and specifically to a method of authenticating one wireless device by using another
5 wireless device.

Wireless access to communication and information services is a recent and growing trend in the telecommunications and data processing industries. Wireless communication services, such as cellular telephone services, have become ubiquitous. Wireless local area networks providing wireless access to computer networks such as
10 the Internet, are also becoming commonplace, particularly in areas frequented by travelers, such as airport lounges, coffee shops, hotels, and the like.

User access to wireless local area networks is typically restricted, such as by subscription, with only subscribed users granted access, or on a pay-per-use basis. In either case, access to the resource is usually only granted following a registration
15 procedure, which typically includes an authentication process to prevent unauthorized or fraudulent access. Additionally, while logged onto the wireless local area networks (even those that do not require registration), users may engage in e-commerce transactions, which may require authentication.

Generally, authentication includes a challenge-response process, in which the
20 wireless service network transmits a "challenge" to the user's device, in the form of a particular code or digital sequence. The device receives the sequence, and generates a "response" utilizing a secret "key" or code. The device sends the response to the network, which compares it against an anticipated response. If the response is proper, the user is authenticated and the registration or transaction proceeds. If the response is

incorrect, the network may re-issue one or more challenges, and may eventually deny access to the requested service or transaction if the user's device cannot generate a proper response. Note that the device never directly transmits the key to the network, which would create a security risk, as the key could be intercepted and used fraudulently.

As the number of wireless-enabled devices and wireless services increase, key distribution and management may become problematic. For example, many users already have authentication keys embedded in their cellular radiotelephones. However, the situations described above may require authentication to be performed by a separate device, such as a laptop computer. If the two devices are able to communicate, such as for example over a short-range wireless interface, the cellphone could transmit the key to the laptop. However, this raises serious security concerns since the transmission may be intercepted.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention includes a method of authenticating a wireless device to a network challenging the device. The method comprises receiving an authentication challenge from the network at a first wireless device and forwarding the authentication challenge to a second wireless device that contains an authentication key. The second device calculates an authentication response based on the authentication key, and forwards the authentication response to the first wireless device. The first device then transmits the authentication response to the network.

In one embodiment, the present invention includes a method of authenticating a wireless device to a network without knowledge of an authentication key. The method includes receiving at a second network without knowledge of the key, an authentication challenge from a first network with knowledge of the key. The second network issues

the authentication challenge to a first wireless device to be authenticated. The second network receives a response from the first wireless device, where the response was calculated by a second wireless device containing an authentication key. The second network forwards the response to the first network and receives an authentication result
5 calculated by the first network based on the response and the first network's knowledge of the authentication key.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

Figure 1 is a functional block diagram showing two wireless communication devices for communicating with two wireless networks;

10 Figure 2 is a flowchart depicting an authentication method according to one embodiment of the present invention; and

Figure 3 is a flowchart depicting an authentication method according to another embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

15 Figure 1 depicts a functional block diagram of a multi-wireless services environment, indicated generally by the numeral 10. A communication device 12 is wirelessly connected to a first wireless network 14, such as a wireless communication network, which is in turn connected to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) 16. A computing device 18 is wirelessly connected to a second wireless network 20,
20 such as a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), which is in turn connected to one or more computer networks such as the Internet 22.

The communication device 12 may comprise a cellular radiotelephone; a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) that may combine a cellular radiotelephone with data processing, facsimile and data communications capabilities; or a card that inserts into

computing device 18. The communication device 18 is represented in Fig. 1 as a cellular radiotelephone with a cellular radio interface 23 to communicate with a wireless communication network 14. The computing device 18 may, for example, comprise a portable computer (variously known as a laptop, notebook, palmtop, or the like), a PDA,
5 or similar device with a microprocessor. The computing device 18 includes a WLAN interface 21, which may for example be an 802.11(b) interface, to communicate with the WLAN.

Both the communication device 12 and the computing device 18 include a second interface 24, which in the disclosed embodiment is a wireless interface, that
10 allows the communication device 12 and computing device 18 to communicate with one another. A common wireless interface used for short-range communications is the BLUETOOTH interface. Other wireless interfaces could also be used, such as an infrared interface or other radio interface. The communication device 12 and computing device 18 could also be coupled via a wire, cable or optical fiber. As will be described in
15 more detail below, the second interface 24 allows the computing device 18 to utilize secret information stored in the communication device 12 to access the WLAN 20.

The wireless communication network 14 connects communication device 12 with other communication devices (not shown), and with terminals connected to the PSTN 16, over one or more communication channels. A channel may comprise a frequency, a
20 timeslot, a CDMA code, a frequency hopping pattern or any combination of these, depending on the radio air-interface standard in use. Representative standards include Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) standards such as the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) / Electronics Industry Alliance (EIA) standard TIA/EIA-136, or the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM); Code Division Multiple Access
25 (CDMA) standards such as IS-95, cdma2000, and Wideband CDMA (W-CDMA); or a broad variety of other wireless communications technologies and protocols, such as the

Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). While wireless communication network 14 is explicated herein with reference to the cdma2000 standard, the present invention is not thus limited, and may be implemented by one of skill in the art in a wide variety of wireless communication networks.

5 The Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) 20 provides high-bandwidth data communications to appropriately equipped computing devices 18. WLANs 20 may be implemented according to a variety of protocols and technical standards, such as for example, IEEE 802.11(b) (also known as "Wi-Fi"); the short-range wireless ad hoc network developed and promulgated by Telefonaktiebolaget L.M. Ericsson, known
10 commercially as BLUETOOTH; IEEE 802.11(a); or HiperLAN/2. WLAN 20 may illustratively be based on the IMT-2000 standard, and may conform to the Wireless IP Architecture as described in publication TIA/EIA/TSB-115, incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

 WLAN 20 is characterized by high bandwidth data communications and limited
15 geographic extent of coverage. WLAN 20 may be deployed for private use within offices, universities, laboratories, and the like, and for public use in airport lounges, coffee shops, hotels, and the like. WLAN 20 may additionally be deployed over wider areas, such as a university campus, or several city blocks. Two or more WLANs 20 may be interconnected to provide high-bandwidth data communications over a metropolitan
20 area. The areas covered by WLAN 20 typically form islands surrounded by areas with no such service. These islands are commonly referred to as "hot spots."

 WLAN 20 may be provided by the same service provider as the communication network 14, or alternatively, WLAN 20 may be provided by independent service providers, such as Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs) or site operators. User
25 access to the WLAN 20 may be restricted, such as for example, by subscription with only subscribed users granted access. Alternatively, access to the WLAN 20 may be

open to the general public, either on a pay-per-use basis or without billing, such as to induce customers to patronize an establishment. Users of restricted access WLAN 20 must register with the WLAN 20 prior to accessing its services, which registration process may include a challenge-response procedure. In addition, pay-per-use users
5 may be authenticated periodically, also using a challenge-response procedure.

Regardless of the access model or need for registration, all users may be required to authenticate their identities to the WLAN 20 at various times, such as to engage in e-commerce transactions within the WLAN 20 or other networks accessed through it.

The challenge-response paradigm of authentication is well known in the
10 cryptographic and data security arts, and has been implemented in several defined standards, such as for example the Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP). CHAP is based on one or more "keys" issued to the user to be authenticated. A key may for example comprise a number, an alphanumeric string, or a digital code. The key is maintained in strict secrecy, and is known only to the user and the network
15 that performs authentication. In other implementations, such as within a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based system, two mathematically related keys are associated with each user – a private key that the user keeps secret, and a public key that is published or transferred to the party or network to whom the user is to be authenticated. The present invention addresses any challenge-response authentication protocol, including
20 for example both CHAP and PKI based systems.

Where authentication is always performed via a device, such as for example, authenticating a user in a cellular wireless communication network 14, the key (at least the private key, in a PKI environment) may be programmed directly into the user's access device, such as his or her cellular radiotelephone 12. The communication device
25 12 with a key programmed therein is referred to as a "provisioned" device 12; and the wireless computing device 18 without a key is "non-provisioned" device. Provisioning a

device 12 with a key increases security and is convenient to the user, who need not enter the key for authentication every time the user accesses the wireless communication network 14. For security, the key is maintained in secret, and for example is not transmitted to or from the communication device 12 in a non-encrypted format. The key may be stored for example, in a secure authentication unit 25, such as a removable, tamper-resistant smart card that includes both memory 27 for storing secret information and a processor 29 for performing cryptographic calculations with the secret information.

Authentication is described herein, by way of explanation and without limitation, as it occurs between a user's communication device 12 and the wireless communication network 14 (assuming the communication device 12 is a provisioned device). Authentication centers on the user's key. The key may, for example, comprise a 64-bit secret pattern assigned and stored in permanent memory in the provisioned device 12. The provisioned device 12 is additionally identified by an Electronic Serial Number (ESN), which is a 32-bit binary number that uniquely identifies the provisioned device 12 to any wireless network 14. The ESN is encoded into the provisioned device 12 at the factory and is not readily alterable in the field; modification of the ESN requires a special facility not normally available to users.

Both the wireless network 14 and the provisioned device 12 generate identical Shared Secret Data (SSD). The SSD is a 128-bit pattern stored in the semi-permanent memory 27 of the provisioned device 12, and is maintained during power-off. The SSD may be generated using a 56-bit random number RANDSSD created and transmitted by the wireless network 14, the user's key, and the ESN of the provisioned device 12.

During a challenge-response authentication procedure, the network 14 issues a "challenge" to the wireless device 12 attempting to access the wireless network 14. The challenge may for example comprise a 32-bit random number RAND. The provisioned

device 12 calculates a "response," which may comprise an encrypted version of RAND, using a portion of the SSD. The provisioned device 12 then transmits the response to the network 14. Neither the user's key nor the SSD is transmitted between the provisioned device 12 and the network 14, for security. The network 14 performs the same calculation, using RAND and the SSD associated with the particular provisioned device 12, and confirms the identity of the provisioned device 12 by comparing its expected response with the response transmitted by the provisioned device 12.

In a similar fashion, a challenge-response authentication process may occur between a WLAN 20 and a user's computing device 18 (either as part of registration with the WLAN 20 or to engage in e-commerce transactions, such as on the Internet 22). The user's key may be programmed into the computing device 18, or may be attached thereto, such as through a Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) interface. In many situations, however, the user would prefer to maintain only one key. For example, the WLAN 20 may be operated by the service provider supplying the wireless communication network 14. In this case, the WLAN 20 will allow the user to access the WLAN 20 without a prior service agreement if the wireless network 14 authenticates the user. This requires signaling between the WLAN 20 and the wireless network 14. In this case, the user may desire for all of his access charges – associated with the WLAN 20 as well as with the wireless network 14 – to be tracked and billed under the same account. A similar situation may result when the WLAN 20 is operated by an independent service provider, but one that has a reciprocal billing arrangement with the operator of the wireless network 14. The use of one user key may be advantageous or desirable for other reasons. For example, a user may wish to access a WLAN 20 for personal reasons on a company computing device 18, and may prefer his access charges and e-commerce transactions to be billed to his wireless network 14 account, even if the computing device 18 has a separate key.

Communication devices 12 and computing devices 18 are increasingly equipped with advanced communication capabilities. In particular, many devices 12, 18 include interfaces that allow for the creation of Wireless Personal Networks (WPN). One example of such interfaces is the BLUETOOTH® wireless technology. The

5 BLUETOOTH standard and protocol describe the creation of short-range, wireless, ad-hoc networks for data communication among a variety of disparate devices 12, 18. The BLUETOOTH wireless technology is further described in "An Overview of the Bluetooth Wireless Technology" by Chatschik Biskikian, IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 39, No. 12, p. 86 (Dec. 2001) incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The

10 BLUETOOTH interface 24 between the user's communication device 12 and computing device 18 is shown in Fig. 2. While one straightforward solution to the above described problems may seem to be simply transmitting the user's key from the communication device 12 to the computing device 18 across the BLUETOOTH link 24, for the calculation of a response at the computing device 18, this poses a severe security risk, as it requires the key to be transmitted on an open wireless data link, where it is subject
15 to interception and subsequent fraudulent use.

The remote authentication method of the present invention solves the problem of authenticating non-provisioned devices 18 that can communicate with a provisioned device 12, and is explained with reference to the flowchart of Figure 2. According to the
20 present invention, when the non-provisioned device, in this case the computing device 18, receives an authentication challenge from the WLAN 20, such as, for example, across an IEEE 802.11(b) interface (block 30), the non-provisioned device 18 transmits the challenge to the provisioned device, in this case the communication device 12 (block 32). The provisioned device 12 then calculates an authentication response based on the
25 user's key (block 34), and transmits the authentication response to the non-provisioned device 18, such as across the BLUETOOTH link 24 (block 36). The non-provisioned

device 18 then transmits the response to the WLAN 20, such as across the IEEE

802.11(b) interface (block 38), which compares the received authentication response to an expected authentication response to complete the authentication procedure (block 40). In this manner, the provisioned device 12 may authenticate any number of non-
5 provisioned devices 18, all using the single key contained in the user's provisioned device 12.

The method depicted in Fig. 2 and described above assumes that the key contained in the provisioned device 12 is known to the service network (e.g., the WLAN 20) authenticating the non-provisioned device 18, or that the service network has a
10 related key, such as the user's public key in a PKI environment. This may be the case, for example, if the WLAN 20 is hosted by the operator of the wireless communication network 14. However, the WLAN 20 may be hosted by a third party, such as for example a WISP. In this case, to authenticate the user via the user's key in the provisioned device 12, the WLAN 20 must additionally communicate with the wireless
15 communication network 14. This may occur over the link 26 depicted in Fig. 1, which may comprise an IP network, an SS7 signaling link, a dedicated T1/E1 trunk, or the like.

A method of authenticating a user without knowledge of the user's key is depicted in the flowchart of Fig. 3. The WLAN 20 requiring authentication is referred to as the secondary network, and the wireless communication network 14, with knowledge
20 of the user's key, is referred to as the primary network. When a user attempts to log onto the secondary network 20, (or authorize an e-commerce transaction on the secondary network 20), the secondary network 20 sends an authorization request to the primary network 14 (block 50), identifying the user (such as, for example, based on identifying information provided during the registration procedure). The primary network
25 14, with knowledge of the user's key or a related key, formulates an authentication challenge and transmits the challenge to the secondary network 20, (step 52). The

secondary network forwards the challenge to the non-provisioned device 18 (block 54), which in turn transmits the challenge to the provisioned device 12 (block 56). The provisioned device 12 then calculates a response based on the user's key (block 58), and transmits the response to the non-provisioned device 18. The non-provisioned
5 device 18 then transmits the response to the secondary network 20 (block 62). The secondary network 20 in turn transmits the response to the primary network 14 (block 64). The primary network 14 compares the response to an expected response, thus performing authentication of the user (block 66). The primary network 14 then transmits the result of the authentication to the secondary network 20 (block 68), and based on the
10 result, the secondary network 20 completes the registration, approves the transaction, initiates a re-try, or takes other action with respect to the non-provisioned device 18, as appropriate.

Although the present invention has been described herein with respect to particular features, aspects and embodiments thereof, it will be apparent that numerous
15 variations, modifications, and other embodiments are possible within the broad scope of the present invention, and accordingly, all variations, modifications and embodiments are to be regarded as being within the scope of the invention. The present embodiments are therefore to be construed in all aspects as illustrative and not restrictive and all changes coming within the meaning and equivalency range of the appended claims are
20 intended to be embraced therein.